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Abstract 
Italian firms have recently engaged in direct investment abroad through the establishment 
of production facilities in China and India. Using data gathered from interviews conducted in 
those countries in 2009 with 16 Italian predominantly small and medium-sized firms, this 
article explores: the motivations behind Italian parent companies’ decisions to create 
subsidiaries in Asia; relations between the newly established production facilities and their 
local suppliers and markets; any subsequent organizational adaptations; and the cultural 
and administrative difficulties the enterprises have encountered. The article provides a novel 
perspective on how predominantly small and medium-sized manufacturing firms achieve 
cost and  differentiation advantages by leveraging  their dynamic capabilities. 
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1. Introduction.  
 
This article examines the prospects and problems faced by Italian firms that recently 
established production facilities in China and India through direct investment. Over 4 
months, in spring 2009, we visited 16 factories in China and India – most of them of small 
and medium size (controlled by Italian parent companies) - , and discussed with their 
general managers the reasons underlying the decision to produce abroad; the direction, 
extent and nature of adaptation (in respect of strategies, structures, resources, and more) 
to foreign market conditions; and the character of the management of new networks that 
were created, in relation to the parent companies, to foreign suppliers, and to the sales 
market2.  
 
                                                
1 I would like to thank the participants in the seminar of the School of Economics at the University of Reading 
where the paper was discussed. Special thanks are due to Marina della Giusta, Carlo Gianelle, Andrea Ginzburg, 
Faith Hatani, David Lane, and Frank Pyke for their careful reading and valuable comments. Partial funding was 
provided by Osservatorio economico provinciale, Treviso. 
2 Hatani (2009; 2010). These are the main questions faced today by  international business, according to the 
Delphi study  (Griffith, Cavusgil, Xu, 2008) 
 
 
 2 
The article begins, in Section 2,  with an outline of the research methodology used in the 
study. The following Section 3 discusses the role of country specific circumstances in 
explaining the development of the cross border organisation of Italian firms, comparing the 
strategies of internationalization towards Asia with that towards Central and Eastern Europe. 
Section 4 presents firm level case studies and discusses how firms have adapted their 
specific advantages to the particular circumstances of foreign markets.  Firms are grouped 
into 3 clusters according to the motives that induced the Italian parent companies to create 
subsidiaries in China or India. Each group is discussed in a sub-section (4.1, 4.2, 4.3). 
Section 5 summarizes the previous discussion and considers the shift made by several firms 
in moving from “competitive advantage” to “sustainable advantage” through the creation of 
dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1994;1997). The subsequent Section 6 reports on binding 
institutional constraints faced by subsidiaries and the necessary adaptation of managerial 
strategies.  The following section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Research Methodology The investigation of the experiences of Italian firms investing 
abroad employed a multiple case study approach. Through qualitative research we were able 
to achieve a comprehensive understanding of how events unfolded and the context in which 
this occurred. Firms were selected according to their size and sector, and their readiness to 
grant permission to visit their foreign plants and carry out detailed interviews with the 
managers. Not all firms that were asked agreed to our request. Reasons for refusal mainly 
related to difficulties connected to  subsidiary re-organization.  
We interviewed 16 firms in China or India, all of which have Italian parent companies in part 
or in whole. In fact, 13 of the subsidiaries in Asia were 100% controlled by a parent 
company in Italy; the remaining 3 had participation by Chinese firms. Some of the 
subsidiaries had the same parent company (the Carraro Group) which meant that the total 
number of parent companies was 12.  Of these, 10 had additional subsidiary plants in other 
countries.  Also, 10 of the parent companies were located in Veneto, a region in the North 
East of Italy, and it was to the Asian subsidiaries of these companies that our interviews 
were initially directed.  Interviews with the subsidiaries of 2 more Italian parent firms were 
added during the process. All but 3 interviewed subsidiaries in Asia were small or medium 
sized3. 9 of them belonged to medium-sized groups4 with well-known brands. 7 belonged to 
                                                
3 The legal definition varies by country and by industry (Peterson et al. 1986). In line with most definitions, in this 
paper a small firm is defined as having fewer than 50 employees (L, table 1), a medium-sized firm as having 
between 51 and 249, and a large-sized business as one with 250 or more employees (G,O,P) (See, for example, 
the  OECD, 2005, p. 17). According to this definition, the majority of our interviewed subsidiaries were of medium 
size. However, using a definition based on size of turnover all interviewed subsidiaries but 2 would be defined as  of 
small size. C and Q are of medium size according to the size of turnover. 
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large groups.  Of these, 5 (B,C,D,O,Q: See Table 1) belonged to a single  important 
mechanical engineering group (Carraro), 1 (H) to a technical textiles group (Filmanmande), 
and 1 (P) to a cotton textiles group (Monti). The biggest group employs worldwide more 
than 4,000 employees, while the second and third biggest have around 1000. 
The majority of the head offices of the interviewed firms (B,C,D,E,L,N,O,Q: See Table 1) are 
located in the “mechanical district” of Padua in the Veneto region, Italy; 2 (R,M) are located 
close to that district’s borders; 2 (H,P) belong to the textiles-garments sector and are 
located in Treviso, Veneto region; and 2 (A,G) belong to the “furniture district” of Treviso; of 
the remaining 2, 1 (F) is located in the Republic of San Marino, and the other (I) in Brescia, 
northern Italy.  
All the firms retained their headquarters in Italy (or San Marino) and all but one retained in 
Italy their most important manufacturing units. The large majority of parent firms already 
had international expertise and were following a strategy of continuous geographic 
expansion. All firms were challenged by their entrance into markets that presented entirely 
new environments. 
A "case" is defined as a visit to an industrial plant accompanied by an in-depth interview 
with a senior manager. Interviews were transcribed, and then analysed. The use of open 
interviews allowed a respondent driven agenda to emerge, permitting the Italian managers 
interviewed to concentrate on what they considered to be the important aspects of their 
Asian operations, thereby avoiding certain biases associated with more structured interview 
approaches. One of the most powerful sources of evidence is when in a case study approach  
interviewees use their  own words to "tell the story." We have followed this method to bring 
the reader into the world of the participants, who provide in depth insights into the rationale 
for events and the rich contexts in which they occur (Mintzberg, 1979; Van Maanen, 1988; 
Yin, 2003). 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted both in Asia (16 interviews) and in Italy (4 
interviews) in two waves between October 2008 and June 2009. All interviewed persons held 
a leading top management position. Each interview lasted at least two hours, in many cases 
half a day, and in all cases included a tour of the factory, both in Italy and in Asia. All but 2 
interviews were conducted in Italian; the other  2 were conducted in English. The interviews 
focused on company background and marketing policy, motivations for the entry into the 
                                                
Of course, none of the small and medium-sized businesses we interviewed had a completely independent 
management and nor were they independently owned. We are well aware that a firm’s behaviour is influenced by 
how it may be linked to a group to which it belongs, and/or by the sector in which the group operates.  
4 The OECD defines the size of a group by adding up the employees and turnover of all members. 
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Asian market, the position of the firm in the value chain, and relations with and policies 
towards customers, consumers and local suppliers. 
Information was complemented by interviews in China with two Italian government agencies  
that have the role of supporting Italian firms in Asia (The Italian Chamber of Commerce and 
the Italian Trade Institute), and by follow-up contacts with people we interviewed, and by 
reviews of press releases and company material. 
 
Sectors 
 
Cases span several sectors i.e. mechanical engineering, textiles and garments, and 
furniture; and involve firms of varying dimensions, with the consequence that the research 
has highlighted a spectrum of adaptation efforts by enterprises driven to Asia for different 
purposes. 
10 out of the 16 firms interviewed belonged to the mechanical engineering sector. Of 
these 10, 5 belonged to the Carraro group, which is a leader in the production of axles, 
transmissions, and final and slew drives for agricultural and construction equipment. We 
interviewed the directors of two factories in the drive system division of the Group in China 
(Quingdao:B) and in India (Pune:C); the directors of 2 plants in the gear division in India 
(Pune:Q) and in China (Suhzou:O); and also in the research division the director of the 
design centre in Pune (D). 
Also in the mechanical engineering sector, we interviewed the directors of subsidiaries that 
produced agricultural machinery (Maschio: N), hydraulic fittings (Genarl Fittings: I), 
radiators (Irsap: M), pressure washers (Hydroeast: L), welding machines (Ritmo: E), and 
amusement rides (Zamperla: R). They all produce their own brand products and have well 
defined niches in their respective international markets. 
The remaining 5 of the interviewed firms belonged to the “traditional manufacturing” sectors 
of textiles and furniture. These included: a cotton factory in India (Monti: P); a producer 
of high performance yarns in the sub-sector of technical textiles (Filmanmade: H); and 3 
furniture firms (Colombini: A; Faram: G; DalianMato: F).   
For 9 firms (B,C,D,H,L,N,O,P,Q) the interviews at the foreign plants were  supplemented 
with interviews in their  parent firms in Italy. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of 
the interviewed firms. 
 
<TABLE 1> 
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All the firms employed technology that was modern for their sectors, and used, whenever 
necessary, European components in order to ensure product quality. In fact, the proportion 
of components used that are imported varies a lot, according to the particular strategy 
pursued by each firm.  However, sometimes the use of low cost of labour is reflected  by the 
presence of low levels of automation. For example, activities such as stock control, 
warehouse usage, and quality control are often manually executed; in contrast, the 
corresponding operations in Italy would have been organized with a higher level of 
automation. 2 firms (L, J) made extensive use of machinery transferred to China from Italian 
parent companies, which was later updated with more automated technology.  
 
3. Off-shoring and Production Internationalization. 
 
Italian firms initiated significant internationalization strategies in the mid-nineties and today 
the off-shoring of a part of production is an important feature of that country’s 
manufacturing system, in particular in the North Eastern regions of Italy (Schiattarella, 
2001; Tattara, 2011). Until the late eighties Italian firms operating in the international 
market were mainly concerned with expanding their exports, and increasing their share of 
markets in the richest countries, selling in Europe products manufactured at home, in Italy. 
Since the mid-nineties, however, many firms began transferring a significant part of their 
manufacturing activity across borders to other  countries, which  also provided flourishing 
sales markets.  
It became profitable to develop outside Italy a part of production with the onset of 
circumstances that reduced transaction costs involved in operating abroad. At the macro 
level (Kedia, Mukherjee, 2009), the establishment of a fixed exchange rate in the late 
nineties, and the subsequent appreciation of the Euro, induced Italian export firms to 
abandon a strategy of making their products more competitive through currency 
devaluation. Currency devaluation had been a strategy that Italian firms had practised after 
the defeat, in the early seventies, of the Bretton-Woods regime of fixed exchange rates, and 
which had promoted exports, with alternating movements, for 25 years. In the nineties, with 
the defeat of the Soviet empire, new territories in Central and Eastern Europe, close to two 
of the most important countries of industrial Europe, Germany and Italy, opened up to 
foreign investment. Countries with stable social and political structures, educated 
populations, low labour costs, and fiscal regimes very favourable to foreign investments 
encouraged Italian firms to establish plants there.  
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Until the mid-1990s, for Italian firms the role of developing Asian economies as places for 
investment remained negligible. However, as emerging countries, particularly in Asia, 
removed restrictions, and implemented policies to attract foreign direct investment inflows, 
a new interest developed.   Producing in China and India, and other Asian countries, became 
to be seen as attractive because of the low cost of resources and because firms producing 
locally can easily adapt and quickly benefit from a growing consumer demand due to the 
rapid growth of incomes and populations (Agarwal, 1980; Kaplinsky, Farooki, 2010). 
Nonetheless, few Italian firms have yet in 2011 established production activities in these 
countries.  Indeed, many are reluctant to launch new businesses so far away, and in fact 
many firms that did so have gone bankrupt5. Managerial decisions about internationalization 
must take into account the nature of the  environment in which enterprises operate: obvious 
advantages may be balanced by costs that relate to cultural, administrative, geographical 
and economic (CAGE) distance (Ghemawat, 2007).  
For our sample, all the parent firms but 3 have other factories abroad and for them the 
move to Asia can be considered a step in a process of incremental acquisition of knowledge 
of foreign markets6. By the mid-nineties firms in Veneto districts were faced by increased 
competition and felt that the advantages linked to their traditional local assets were rapidly 
fading away and their claimed superiority over non district firms was being questioned 
(Iuzzolino, Micucci, 2007; Iuzzolino, Menon, 2010; Callegari, Callegaro, Tattara, 2010). In 
order to meet the competition district firms now had to use a wider range of suppliers and to 
internationalize parts of production that were once outsourced locally. 
The majority of the parent firms have plants in Central and Eastern Europe: in Poland, in 
Russia and in Slovenia, and especially in Romania. Today, in the most developed area of 
Romania there are difficulties in labour recruitment because of a massive emigration of 
Romanians. Because of the constant appreciation of the Euro in relation to the Dollar the 
relative cost of labour in Eastern and Central Europe has risen considerably, and this factor 
together with a lowering of transport costs to places elsewhere in the world means we are 
now seeing a transfer of production from Europe to North Africa and to Asia. In most recent 
years, China, and to a lesser degree, India, have offered European investors not only a 
                                                
5  According to anecdotal evidence provided to us by the director of the Italian Foreign trade institute, and by the 
secretary of the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, the story of Italian foreign investments in China is not 
encouraging.  
6 The acquisition of information in “psychically distant” markets - different in culture, language, levels of education 
and economic development - is part of a learning process. Firms start with exports and gradually engage in 
producing abroad. Only at a subsequent stage are they willing and able to capitalize on their positions to achieve 
sales penetration in the local market (Johansson and Vahlne, 1977; 2009; Chang, Rosenzweig, 1998; De Propris, 
Menghinello, Sugden, 2008), although the rapid growth of the Asian market gave a big impetus in this direction. 
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reservoir of cheap labour but also enormous and profitable consumer markets7. Available 
data on direct investments confirm a relative stagnation of flows moving from Italy to 
Central and East European (CEE) countries (+16% between 2002 and 2009 measured by 
the number of employees), while direct investments directed towards Asia have rapidly 
increased (+35%). 
Internationalization derives from the ability to adapt firm specific advantages to the 
circumstances of foreign markets. Such adaptation takes multiple forms, including 
engagement in commodity flows, subcontracting, direct investments, commercial and 
technological agreements, licences and other arrangements formal and informal (Rugman, 
Verbeke 2005; De Propris, Menghinello, Sugden, 2008).  
Data is currently available in a systematic way for trade flows and direct investments.  
Italy’s imports from some CEE countries mainly relate to the clothing and footwear 
subcontracting trade. This is particularly the case for Romania, from where 61% of imported 
goods to Italy in 2009 were so related. For Romania, imports from that country into Italy are 
an end stage of a process which firstly saw the export of semi-manufactured goods and raw 
materials from Italian based firms to firms in Romania, owned either by local or Italian 
entrepreneurs; then the Romanian firms used the imported materials to manufacture and 
subsequently re-export to Italy finished products or advanced level parts, which are then 
distributed (Crestanello, Tattara, 2010).  
Levels of imports to Italy of textiles, clothing and footwear from Romania were close to 
imports from China in value until 2006. Subsequently, China took the lead, but products 
imported from China have been mainly produced utilizing a model of full package 
outsourcing by Italian brands. Under this model, articles are manufactured by large local 
firms capable of processing high volumes at low prices; and raw materials and accessories 
are acquired directly in the Asian market, where it is possible to find quality and variety. 
There is not an equal flow of exports from Italy to China for these commodities. In contrast, 
Romanian imports from, and exports to, Italy are of similar values because Italian exports to 
that country provide the basic materials for producing future imports under sourcing 
agreements. 
In clothing and footwear, due to the importance of subcontracting, commodity flows 
between Italy and CEE countries are basically reciprocal.  Internationalization is 
accomplished by large inflows and outflows of commodities across a country’s borders in a 
                                                
7 The  cost of labour in China and India is a fraction of that in Italy, and is definitively lower than in Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries, and energy and components purchased on the local markets are definitively 
cheaper than those purchased in Italy. International outsourcing to Romania is mainly cost-driven, while in the 
case of Asia it is market-seeking, first, and  then cost-driven. 
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sequence of transactions that are, in most cases, internal to the firm (Tattara, 2005). 
In the mechanical engineering industry a different situation exists. In this industry, control 
of proprietary knowledge of key aspects of industrial technology is important. Consequently, 
usually, when a firm from one country establishes a subsidiary in an emerging country in 
order to have access to cheaper resources, hierarchical relations between the parent 
company and the subsidiary are maintained, and only gradually is the subsidiary allowed to 
acquire autonomy in respect of either local sourcing or the sales market8.  
Italian foreign direct investments are overall bigger in CEE countries than in Asia, but those 
investments in European countries are mainly in “traditional sectors”, while in Asia the 
mechanical engineering industry is important (figure 1) and has been gaining ground rapidly 
in recent years. The rate of increase in the number of Italian foreign direct investments in 
CEE countries from 2002 to 2009 is nil in traditional sectors and positive in mechanical 
engineering industries (+5%), while both sectors have grown at significant rates in Asia 
(respectively 18% and 54%).  
 
<FIGURE 1> 
 
4. The Case Studies: Different Strategies of Subsidiaries in Asia. 
 
Our case studies are summarized in Section 2-table 1. To better understand how a firm 
develops a competitive advantage, value chain theory divides up the business system into a 
series of “primary” activities.  These are then conceived as being underpinned  by “support” 
activities, providing various inputs or infrastructures that allow the primary activities to 
occur on an ongoing basis (Porter, 1985). “It is only at the level of discrete activities  that 
the competitive advantage can be truly understood” (Porter, 1986, p. 13). Primary activities 
include procurement, inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, 
and services9.  
The organisation of the value chain is conceived as being characterised by semi-autonomous 
units which can vary their activities independently of one another. Typically a firm must 
locate downstream activities such as marketing close to the buyer in the countries in which 
it operates while upstream activities can, at least conceptually, be decoupled from where the 
buyer is located (Porter, 1986, p.16). There are two driving forces which may decouple the 
                                                
8 See, for example, Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005, 85 ff.) 
9 This classification is tailored to our interviews and differs slightly from the classic Porter’s classification (see Porter, 
1985). For a recent study on offshoring by French firms, see Jabbour (2008). 
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links in an existing chain10, namely:  the search for low cost resources, and, secondly, the 
desire  to achieve a better product differentiation. This reflects the fact that there are 
thought to be two alternative kinds of competitive advantage that a firm can possess: one 
based on low relative cost and another on product differentiation (Porter, 1986, p. 25; 
Wathne, Heide, 2004).  
Interviewed Italian firms moving to China and India came from different perspectives and 
each subsidiary employed different strategies according to: the motivations parent 
companies had for establishing them; the power relation between subsidiaries and their 
parent companies; and the strategies the subsidiaries were able to implement and pursue. 
For the purposes of this article, the subsidiaries have been grouped into 3 clusters.  These 
include a first cluster where subsidiaries had a low level of independence thanks to a high 
power asymmetry with parent companies, and where the firms were initially  established 
abroad in order to reduce production costs.  In a second group, firms have been clustered 
which have been pulled into foreign markets by the internationalisation activities of larger 
network partners, and where the ability to compete abroad was a  function of the 
technological embeddedness of the subsidiary. A third cluster includes subsidiaries for which 
the motivation to set them up included a significant consideration of accessing markets. 
These firms have a more autonomous management, and sell in the foreign market with their 
own brand products engineered in Italy and adapted to  local market needs. 
 
4.1. Cluster 1. At First Seeking Cost Advantages but then Sales in Asian Markets.   
 
This cluster groups firms that initially went to Asia in order for the parent company to exploit 
differences in absolute costs of labour and components (Li et al., 2008; Swan, Allred, 
2009)11, and more advantageous fiscal regimes. This strategy was pursued by 6 firms 
(E,I,N,L,P), but then for 3 of them, to varying degrees, there  was an evolution. The firms 
making cotton textiles (P), welding machines (E) and fittings (I), once they had settled in 
Asia, searched for their own production and sale niches on that market, engendering a 
                                                
10 Rugman and Verbeke (2004) assume a “normative” hypothetical balanced expansion over time whereby the firm 
specific advantages derived from sourcing locally grow at a similar rate to those derived from Asian  market 
penetration. Our case studies show that this is not a desirable neither a profitable expansion path. Firms decouple 
procurement from distribution and sales market penetration. 
11 The factory making agricultural machinery in China (N), at Quingdao, is part of this group. It is a small factory 
located in rented premises, and produces small agricultural machines (rotary tillers), and also a basic gear box for 
its parent company. At the time of our visit the cost of labour in the factory was 4% of the total cost and 
components accounted for 70%, mainly outsourced.  In Italy, the cost of labour was 35% of the total for the same 
gearbox in the same period. The management in China faced no quality problems as these machines are 
unsophisticated and the components required have large tolerances.  The profitability derived from producing in 
China was explained in the following terms: cost of production for the gear box was 90€ in China and 130€ in Italy. 
The cost of sending  the China produced gearbox to Italy was less than 1€ per unit all included (freight, duties etc). 
60% of  production was sent  to Italy, and 40% to the firm’s representatives in the United States. 
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change in management strategy that was not planned in advance, but proved necessary to 
their survival. 
 
Cotton Textiles Producer 
 
The cotton textiles producer (P) is an important firm producing high quality fabrics, mainly 
for shirt making. It has suffered from an adverse market for classic garments in Europe, and 
by competition from low cost producers, and chose to transfer almost the whole of its 
production to its new plant in India, and to two plants it owns in the Czech Republic, which 
were previously producing for it as subcontractors. Only design, the manufacture of textile 
samples and a very limited segment of the production process have been retained in Italy. 
At the end of the nineties, the Italian plant had almost 1000 employees and produced 20 
million metres of textiles. By the time of the interview, production was split between the 
Indian plant which was producing 7-8 million metres a year, but which had a capacity double 
that, the two Czech Republic plants (producing 1-2 million metres a year), and the Italian 
plant (producing only 250 thousand metres a year) (Campagnol and Tattara, 2008). 
The firm was attracted to India by the good quality cotton yarn available, and by the low 
cost of labour. The cost of labour for its Indian plant was about 100€ a month per blue 
collar. The factory had a complex administrative department that took charge of the large 
initial investment and which also marketed the product in India where, at the time of the 
interview, almost half of the production of the Indian plant was sold. The plant was vertically 
integrated, including in its activities the manufacture of raw yarns and cotton fabrics. From 
the parent company in Italy came design and dies; although dies were sometimes also 
purchased in India where they were manufactured under European licence. Machines used in 
manufacture were almost all Italian or German, most of them brought from the parent 
Italian plant or from the company’s Czech Republic plants, and have been imported duty 
exempted under special provision.  
The cost structure for producing 1 metre of cotton fabric “I dogi” in the India plant is 
detailed in table 2. This fabric was sent to Italy to be sanforized and distributed from the 
Italian headquarters12. 
 
<TABLE 2> 
 
The extent of the cost reduction achieved by the Group by producing in India in comparison 
                                                
12 The reference is to cloth sold in Europe, and the Group took advantage of a recent plant built in Treviso, Veneto, 
a few years before moving production abroad. 
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with an equivalent production in Italy was significant. As one of the owners in Italy told us: 
 
“It is no longer possible to meet international competition with cotton textiles produced in 
Italy. All factories are closing down. The high cost of labour, the high cost of energy and the 
appreciation of the Euro have put us out of the market.Our main competitor produces in the 
Czech Republic and in 2009 it set up a new plant in Egypt. Now the cost of labour in the 
Czech Republic has rapidly increased and the country has lost its attractiveness.” 
 
The unit cost of production of high quality cotton fabric in India was around 2,38 € per 
metre (table 2), 1/3 of the cost in Italy.  The sale price varied between 6 and 8 € per metre 
and consequently after 2005 the Group began again to make  profits,  although the capacity 
of the Indian plant was still underutilized. 
A few years after having established a main plant in India, the Group incrementally added 
further operations there. Familiarity with the country and the size of the market induced ther 
textile factory to enter the shirt making business, an activity that was never directly 
undertaken in Italy but which, at the time of the visit, absorbed more than 1/3 of the total 
production of the plant in India. In order to enter the new business, in 2005 the Group 
established Laguna Clothing, a 50:50 Joint Venture between the Group and Aquarelle of 
Mauritius, a shirt maker working for the most famous European and USA brands, with the 
aim of providing high end  shirts. Initially, shirts were manufactured in a single plant in 
Bangalore with a capacity of 5,000 shirts per day, but  recently (2010) a new plant was 
added bringing the total capacity to 15,000 shirts per day, using the fabrics produced by the 
Indian plant as well as those of others. The Group had never made shirts before; it 
“exapted”13 the traditional home country organization of production to the new environment, 
and added the shirt making phase downstream of weaving  in order to increase revenue and 
profits. By 2009, the shirt factory in Bangalore was responsible for about 40% of total Indian 
textile production, a percentage likely to increase when the new planned factory comes on 
stream. 
 
Fittings Producer 
 
Access to cheap labour was an important country factor condition determining the off-
shoring decision by other firms of this cluster. The fittings producer (I), belongs to  a group 
based in Brescia, Italy, which is a leader in the fittings sector for plumbing and heating. It 
                                                
13 We refer to this choice as “exaptation”, a term imported from biology since the change has implied a new 
functionality in the product or in the management of the firm’s organization (Villani et al. 2007; Lane et al., 2009). 
 
 
 12 
has plants in Italy, Mexico, and Romania and in 2005 it opened a plant in China (Nancjing) 
in order to reduce production costs. At the beginning of 2007, production for the Italian 
parent company started. The production manager told us: 
 
“It was contract manufacturing for the most simple fittings, that are no longer produced in 
Italy. However, high quality forged brass rods made to standard CW617 – the standard 
required by the American and European markets for fittings - are not locally available. So 
brass rods were purchased in Italy by the parent company and then sent to China. From the 
brass rods fittings were made through a die cast process and then sent back to the Italian 
company for distribution. On the whole, the process provided only a marginal contribution to 
Group turnover, and production was not very profitable both because in China the cost of 
labour is relatively high in respect to other South Asian countries and also the brass rods 
sent from Italy were made more expensive by the time and cost of transport” 
 
In die cast manufacturing, the cost of labour in the Chinese plant was 30% of the 
manufacturing cost; the remaining part was accounted for by plant amortization and 
depreciation, metal losses, and energy (which in Nancjing costs  50% less than  in Italy). 
The Chinese plant was less automated than the Italian plant, especially in respect of the 
movement of components, and taking everything into account  the overall cost reduction 
was limited to 25%  of the cost of the same product manufactured in Italy, and so not worth 
the initial investment, which was substantial (table1). 
At the end of 2007 a new management decided that the Chinese plant needed to change its 
function, and to move from contract manufacturing for its parent company to producing 
brass components for the Chinese market. At the time of the interview 25% of total 
production was sold in China. It was a complex move because the Chinese market did not 
demand sanitary metal fittings for private houses where fittings are mainly low quality 
plastic ones, and the new manager has been gearing production towards the automotive and 
shipbuilding industries. At the time of the interview, General Fittings China supplied a wide 
range of standard products as well as articles tailor-made to specific customer demands. 
This change in functionality reduced brass imports because in China Western accreditations 
were not required; the Chinese factory used brass purchased in the local market and 
competed successfully with local producers. 
 
Welding Machines Manufacturer 
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The firm producing welding machines (Ritmo, E) shared part of this story of learning and 
adapting. The Group produces welding machines for any size of plastic pipes and entered 
China to reduce manufacturing costs. The building was rented and the initial investment was 
kept to a minimum. The Group had production plants in Italy and Bulgaria and the 
production made by the plant in China was marginal to the Group turnover. Ritmo entered 
China because two important customers required a lower price and the initial purpose of the 
investment was to assemble and sell in Asia machines for which the parts  were produced in 
Italy. 
To off-shore the assembly line turned out to be not the correct strategy. The importing of 
components was burdened by duties that varied between 5 and 15% of the imported value 
(no drawback was allowed because the machines were sold in the local market) and, at the 
beginning, the imported components accounted for  70% of the final value: the selling price 
was still too high for the Chinese market14. The turnover for the first couple of years was 
very small, a few hundred thousand Euros. In 2008 the strategy changed. A new manager 
created a new brand (NewRitmoAsia), and launched a line tailored to the East Asian market 
with its own brand (mainly China and Indonesia). The aim was to manufacture locally almost 
the entire product, whilst maintaining good quality and reducing drastically imports from 
Italy which by the time of the interview were reduced almost to nothing; an hydraulic 
cylinder was still imported because it was not available to the same quality or, at least, it 
was available but not by firms that supply the short buckles that were required by the 
Chinese plant.  
At the time of the interview, savings on Chinese components varied between 30% and 50%, 
but, against this, at the beginning returned items had peaks as high as 80%.  For example, 
nickel and zinc Chinese plating firms very seldom produced to Western standards, and some 
metal components were roughly finished and were not acceptable to the firm. A strict 
monitoring process was introduced and the percentage of returned items was lowered to 
less than 30%, but this was still too much. 
Both the welding machines manufacturer (E) and the fittings producer (I), at first offshored 
in order to reduce their costs of production but such a strategy did not lead to market 
success and both consciously demonstrated timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible 
product innovation, along with the management capability to effectively coordinate and 
redeploy internal and external competences  in order to sell directly on the foreign market.  
The manager of the fittings producer (I) searched for a new functionality, which was to 
make automobile components, which the company did not make before. The manager of 
                                                
14 Ritmo remains the undisputed leader for electronic machines, where price is less important. 
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welding machines (E) sought local subcontractors for almost all components that were 
previously imported from Italy, delivering a considerable cost reduction, and repositioned 
the product by launching a new series. This move implied a process of selection of suppliers, 
a standardization of production, the ensuring of quality control, and the development of 
relations of trust; only a few strategic components were still imported. This was a difficult 
process for a small firm like the welding machine firm, as the market for components both in 
China and India was not well developed and reliable components were often produced by 
companies supplying big orders for large international firms, but not the limited amounts 
demanded by small sized customers (Buckley, 2004; Lemoine, Ünal-Kesenci, 2002). The 
local supply market for components and parts that can be sourced by a small firm was 
composed of backward local firms who lacked testing equipment and whose product quality 
was often inconsistent (Humphrey, 2008; Kaplinsky,  Farooki, 2010). They were not capable 
of implementing the correct procedures, did not know the proper vocabulary, and technology 
was seldom trustworthy.  
 
High-pressure Washer Manufacturer 
 
The problem of the quality of Chinese components has been tackled and solved successfully 
by the subsidiary company in China of an Italian parent company that produces high-
pressure washers and cleaning machines for professional cleaning. Hydroeast (L) went to 
China to buy at low cost components for its washers and send them back to Italy to be 
assembled, or send them as spare parts to the various markets where the Group sold its 
products (including USA, Europe and Russia). The Chinese market for high-pressure washers 
was still in its infancy and the volume of production sold in China was modest. At the time of 
the interview the percentage of components the factory in China was returning to its local 
suppliers was less than 2%. The manager of the Group told us: 
 
“We have in China about a hundred suppliers, of which 30 are stable suppliers and each of 
which I know in person. To these I grant constant orders, so that they can organize their 
warehouse and respond to our orders just in time.Every new component needs a long 
preparation. On average, from receiving the order to the consignment takes one month 
because our suppliers are small local mechanical engineering firms and communication is 
difficult. The production manager of our subsidiary is in daily contact with our suppliers. If 
they use reliable machines we test a few components, randomly, but if the suppliers use 
 
 
 15 
machines that we don’t consider reliable we test every single component. Any new order is 
split into two suppliers that compete one with another and enter a selection process. 
We have chosen small size suppliers because we purchase small bucks and for this reason 
we have localized our plant in a district of small firms [Ningbo south of Shanghai]. At the 
end of the year our suppliers are evaluated and the best suppliers (according to aspects 
such as quality and timely delivery) are awarded the Hydroeast certified supplier status.  We 
organise an award ceremony at which all our suppliers are invited and they take part 
enthusiastically with all their families. We have created in China the relations of trust that 
we had, and still have, in Veneto with our suppliers”15. 
 
 
4.2. Cluster 2.  Following Large Network Partners.  
 
This cluster groups firms that produce for third parties under subcontracting agreements and 
have been pushed to Asia by their clients.  Retaining key clients was the main motivation. 
Holding onto these clients meant opening subsidiaries in Asia in order to reduce production 
costs, and to maintain an efficient and timely service for their customers. It included the 
members of the Carraro Group (B,C,D,O,Q), the technical textiles firm (H), and a 
manufacturer of furniture components (G).  
 
The Mechanical Engineering Manufacturers 
 
The main customers of the Carraro Group, a big international brand in agricultural 
machinery and construction equipment, sell machinery directly in Asia, and have pressed the 
Italian parent company to open production units in Asia to shorten the time to market of the 
product and to maintain quality at a low unit cost. The Group has invested abroad in 
response to the demands of their main customers, and value chain leaders, which 
subsequent to deciding to move to Asia encouraged their suppliers to follow suit and off-
shore their production. 3 of these firms made big initial investments, around 10-20 millions 
€ (B,C,Q). The other two (D,O) have a comparably lean structure as they occupy rented 
premises. In fact, the Group’s main customers base their reputation on an efficient repair 
capability, and so required the Group to supply components as quickly as possible. Labour 
                                                
15 Hatani shows that, in the case of Toyota, and possibly of other large international firms, suppliers in a well 
integrated network can enter a foreign market even before the establishment of the core firm’s assembly unit 
(Hatani, 2009). On the importance of social networks for manufacturing in developing economies see Danis, De 
Clercq, Petricevic (2011). 
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cost was much less important. 
Among the main customers of the Carraro Group in India (C) and China (B) are producers of 
tractors and construction machines. In India, the subsidiary opened in 1999, under pressure 
from Case New Holland; it produced for Case, Caterpillar, John Deere and others and axles 
for lorries too; a limited quota, 5-10% of production, was supplied to the Indian firms 
Larsen&Toubro and Mahindra (for its tractors). India is the largest world market for tractors, 
but only recently have producers started producing 4 wheel drive vehicles, whose axles are 
a speciality of the Group. In this sector, interest in the Asian market has grown in recent 
years. For example, Caterpillar has moved a significant part of its business to Asia, and in 
2008 this market was responsible for 20% of its turnover (compared with 12% in 2006). To 
reinforce its presence on the Asian market it has recently purchased the Korean firm 
Jinsung, which produces undercarriage components.  
The establishment of the two subsidiaries in Asia was a part of the trend to follow major 
customers to Asia, although the managers of the two plants kept a fairly diversified 
customer portfolio.  As well as producing for similar customers to its sister Indian factory, 
the Quingdao16 plant in China also made steel gears for Kone, the Finnish multinational that 
produces lifts, escalators, and  loading bays, and which in 2005 purchased significant 
enterprises in Asia (Giant Elevators in China and Fuji Lift&Escalator in Malaysia).  
To sell on the Asian market proved difficult and a significant part of the Indian production, 
and a small part of the Chinese production, were sent back to Europe. For example, both in 
India and China, the subsidiaries built drivers for eolic turbines required in Germany by a 
partner of the same Group. The global recession of the last two years drastically reduced 
orders from international corporations and the Group managers were targeting the more 
flourishing Chinese and Indian markets. The attempt to sell domestically was delegated by 
the manager of the China plant to a Chinese dealer Guangzhou Match and prospects were 
favourable. The latest information from the Group headquarters, in 2010, tells us that  the 
value of turnover due to sales in the Chinese market had reached 27% of total turnover of 
the Quingdao plant; at the time of our visit, in 2009, the proportion  was as low as 2%. The 
increase was particularly due to the drive production.  China is now both a prime production 
location and a key market17. 
One characteristic that distinguished the 2 Carraro factories, in India and China, is that the 
second was able to find on the domestic market high-level subcontractors supplying gears of 
                                                
16 On Quingdao, Kim, Zhang (2008) 
17 Our results seem to confirm the finding that  investment is generally more market seeking in China and resource 
seeking in India, with a tendency to evolutionary learning-based upgrading in both countries as argued by Bruche, 
2009. 
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high quality that in India were not easy to find. Consequently, the factories in India and 
China had different structures. In India the factory was vertically integrated with the nearby 
plant Turbo Gear that belonged to the same Group, and had its own steel hardening process, 
and sold 50% of its steel gear production to Carraro India. In the case of the Chinese 
Carraro factory, in contrast, steel gears were purchased from third parties, the customer 
taking advantage of the opportunity to source from large firms that worked for the army; 
only a few special parts, such as gaskets, were imported from Italy18. 
The industrial cost in China of the main product, axles, was at the time of our interview,  
30% less than for similar products manufactured in Europe, and  15% higher than for those 
made  in India. 
 
Technical Textiles Producer 
 
The textile producer (H) produces high-range quality yarns using the most advanced cotton 
spinning technologies available on the market. The yarns are used for the production of 
special fabrics for clothing, furnishings, and sophisticated industrial applications such as 
filtration and protective wear. The Group is the leader in Europe in this field. 
The managing director of the Group told us: 
 
“When our main customer decided to offshore one of its textile units to China we understood 
that we would not be able to continue to supply it from Europe with our yarns, because the 
cost would be too high. We signed a three-year manufacturing agreement with it that 
covered the start-up of our new plant, and we  chose a new location in China together with 
our customer, next to his plant” 
 
Production costs include electric energy (which in Italy is twice that in China), depreciation 
and amortization of machines, and, least significantly, the cost of labour. Production is 
highly automated so that per capita productivity is almost the same in different countries19. 
At the time of the interview the parent company was seeking to utilize the full capacity of its 
Chinese subsidiary by outsourcing orders from Italy.The purchase guaranteed by the main 
                                                
18 The subsidiary gear manufacturing plant in Suzhou (O) was established to supply small metal sinterized gears to 
international producers of electric and gardening tools who  have moved to China a part of their production (such as 
Bosch, Black&Decker, and Stihl). 57% of its production is sold to international firms operating in China, 27% to 
firms operating in North America and the remaining part to companies in Europe. The decision to off-shore this 
production was completely independent from the decision to off-shore the Group subsidiary in Quingdao (B).   
19 In fact, during the world crisis employment in the Chinese plant  declined by 1/3 and then at the first sign of 
recovery, in early 2010, the management  increased staff working hours (12 hours a day instead of the previous 8 
hours, for 6 days) leaving unaffected the number of employees, and so the per capita production is now much 
higher in China than in Italy. 
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customer amounted to 40% of the plant’s production, but only 13% of its optimal capacity. 
To successfully place the remaining part on the Chinese market is a difficult task. The 
manager of the textile plant explained the problem: 
 
“We had two customers in Europe, buying yarns for their industrial filters, one German and 
one Scottish, both of which off-shored to China and once we also moved there we felt sure 
we would be able to continue to sell to them. It has not been so. Both have left us and have 
chosen new Chinese producers that sell to them at a price that is 1/3 of our price.  Filters 
sold in China are of very low quality and our price is not competitive but they are preferred 
because of the absence of strict regulatory standards in the domestic market.20 
Not so for our yarns sold in Turkey where the quality of our yarn is appreciated and we are 
able to sell to Turkish firms even though our product is more expensive than competitors’ 
prices. The reason is that Turkish firms sell mainly to European countries where the 
observation of regulatory standards is compulsory.” 
 
Furniture Components Firm 
 
The furniture components firm (G) in China started in 2007. The factory was located in the 
export industrial zone of Dalian, to the north East of Beijing, and produced solid wood 
kitchen doors. Raw materials included imported water varnish, dried wood imported from 
the United States (oak), Russia and Estonia (ash and birch), and wood panels  bought 
directly in China21.  The firm  exported doors  to large kitchen producers, including British  
and American manufacturers, among these firms belonging to the Ikea Group. For this 
producer also off-shoring has been in response to pressure from its main customers which 
required door panel production at a price the parent company was not able to produce in 
Italy.   
At the time of the visit purchasing agreements were arranged by the Italian headquarters 
and the Chinese plant acted in fact as an off-shored producing unit of the Italian parent 
company. In China the cost of labour was around 5% of the total cost of production; raw 
materials and metal components accounted for 70% and varnishes for 15%. The remaining 
10% or so was down to general expenditures. Local suppliers provided all the packaging 
                                                
20 Standards are likely to be of reduced significance for China according to Kaplinski, Farookil, 2010a; Kaplinski et 
al. 2011; Humphrey, Schmitz, 2008. We have evidence that the lack of regulatory standards in this market 
prevents Italian firms from selling some products  to China. For example the technical textile firm sells regularly in 
North America, but is not able to sell on the Chinese market because a lack of adequate regulatory standards 
makes its products  too expensive for the domestic market. This is a situation shared by the fittings producer which 
die casts two kinds of brass bars, with different specifications and prices for the two markets. 
21 China is a wood resource poor country with a very low forest per capita density. 
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materials. The main customer was Ikea USA; it would not have purchased the more 
expensive kitchen doors produced by the parent company in Italy and demanded a product 
at a lower price, a demand that the Italian plant was not able to meet. 
In all of the firms in cluster 2 the cost of labour is not a significant part of industrial costs. 
For all it amounts roughly to 5% of total costs or less. 
 
4.3. Cluster 3.  Exploiting Asian Market Opportunities to the Forefront.   
 
This cluster groups a set of medium-sized firms that sell on the final market with their own 
brands (A,F,M,R). These firms had important brand positions in Europe and were established 
in Asia to both gain access to a large sales market and to reduce costs of production. Direct 
sales from Italy to China, or to the broader international market, were inhibited by the high 
cost of the Italian product, by import duties and by the distance. These firms were fairly 
independent from their parent companies, and market directly their own production under 
their companies’ brand names.  
 
Manufacturer of Office Furniture 
 
Firm (A) is a world leader in the design and manufacture of office furniture and partitions, 
and is characterised by its use of leading edge technology, and its products by functionality, 
ergonomics, durability and environmental friendliness. The parent Group has four production 
plants in Italy and this one in China. The typical customer is an architecture studio and the 
Group takes part in different competitions at the international level. The Chinese subsidiary 
was created following the visit to Italy of a delegation from Beijing municipality looking for 
foreign investments. Beijing Building Materials Group, a holding of the municipality, has 
minority control.  
At the time of the interview, 75-90% of raw materials were purchased on the Chinese 
market, exact amounts depending on what is being produced, and 25-10% came from Italy. 
In China, the company had a network of suppliers while a strategic supplier (working on 
aluminium bars) worked on the factory premises, in close contact with the contractor’s 
technicians. The Chinese subsidiary sold its output on both the international and Chinese 
markets (around 50%). The main advantage of producing in China was the ability to be able 
to respond quickly to consumer demand.  The frenetic pace of construction occurring in  
China makes the business of contract furnishing frenetic too. 
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Raw materials and semi-finished products acquired in the host country represented about 
30% of total turnover; the cost of labour 14% of total turnover (the unit cost varied 
between 150€ and 170€ per month); and the final industrial cost was 50-60% of the Italian 
cost for a comparable item. 
 
Producer of Fairground Rides 
 
The next firm (R) is a big producer, and world leader, of rides for the amusement industry 
and in the design of the layout of amusement parks. In China, the Group realized a quarter 
of its total turnover. The Group has other production plants in Russia, Slovakia, and the 
Philippines. With the appreciation of the Euro the increase in production costs made it 
difficult for the Group to continue to sell from Europe to China and the parent company 
decided to offshore production to reduce costs. Initially, a plant was set up in the Philippines 
because it was seen as offering a “Western” milieu and an avoidance of linguistic problems, 
but it did not prove the right choice for selling to China where Philippino exports were 
subject to duties. The Group then moved directly to China where it opened a factory in 
Suzhou, close to Shanghai. The products were often single rides, or produced in very short 
series (7-8 rides). They were reworks of designs produced in Italy and were assembled 
using parts and components made by Chinese subcontractors (80% of industrial cost).  
 
Producer of Children’s Bedroom Furniture 
 
The firm (F) is an Italian family enterprise and is the leading manufacturer in Italy in the 
production of children’s bedrooms and bedroom furniture. Its products are distributed in 
Italy, Europe, North America, the Far East and Africa. The creative driving force of the 
company is its centre in Italy dedicated to innovation and design quality.22  The Group 
entered China with a precise market oriented attitude, intending to establish a strong 
position in the niche market for children’s bedrooms. At the time of the interview the 
Chinese firm produced only children’s furniture in melamine (MDF) and sold 80% of the 
product of the Chinese plant on the local market. The panels and various accessories were 
bought in China, the design was made by a Group design team in Italy, and special 
accessories were bought in Italy (e.g. Ferrari23 metal drawer guides). The firm in China had a 
                                                
22 The Group entered the Chinese market in 2005 in a joint partnership with a local firm, although at the time of the 
interview the Group was intending to purchase the share of its partner. 
23 As the manager told us: “I could buy them here, but the brand Ferrari deeply impresses the Chinese customers, 
although it is just an homonym of the famous racing car maker”. 
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unit cost, for the same product, 30% less than the cost of its Italian parent company. The 
lower cost was due both to savings on labour and on components, particularly metal and 
glass parts. The sale price was higher that that of competitive products by 7-8%, but the 
difference reflected a recognised quality premium. 
 
Producer of Radiators 
 
The radiator producer (M) is an Italian-Chinese partnership, the Chinese partner being 
Golden Tiger Radiators of Beijing. Following the purchase, the Group brought to China its 
own machines, made products to its design (mainly tubular radiators), and started selling on 
the domestic market; this absorbed the entire production. A project to also sell to Russia 
was underway at the time of our interview. 
 
5. From Competitive Advantage to Dynamic Capabilities.  
 
The case studies have revealed  that an adequate understanding of the evolution of the 
organisation of value chains requires an awareness of the effects of the particular strategies 
pursued at various points in the chain. That is to say, value chains are not just structured in 
a simple linear fashion according to the behaviour of perceived chain leaders. Rather, our 
analysis indicates that value chain structure and organisation has a dynamic character, and 
that even small and medium-sized subsidiaries that are not themselves chain leaders can 
contribute to that dynamism. 
Of interest here is that some of the subsidiaries we interviewed themselves developed  new 
capabilities – dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1994) – , integrating, building, 
and reconfiguring internal and external competences in the face of a changing environment 
and an evolving competition. Through utilising their  core competencies the subsidiaries 
were able to continuously create and upgrade their asset bases (Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 
1997, p. 516; Tallman, Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002, p.117-18), and build sustainable 
competitive advantages.  
The development of dynamic capability is influenced, firstly, by  the key role of strategic 
management and its ability to appropriately adapt, integrate, and re-configure internal and 
external organizational skills, resources, and functional competences; and, secondly, by an 
ability to adapt to shifting environments. At the time of our interviews, the fall in 
international demand was indeed providing a shifting environment, pushing subsidiaries  to 
orient themselves to a  local market which was still expanding. This was enabled by the fact 
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that Asian countries do not lack skilled technicians capable of design innovations, and 
neither do they lack  sophisticated consumers. 
 From our case studies, it is clear that some subsidiaries were able to develop their dynamic 
capabilities by: leveraging access to skilled labour, engaging in new forms of  production 
organisation, developing a capacity for product differentiation, and participating in new 
marketing, distribution and sales activities. Below, the importance of these activities are 
discussed, both for the subsidiaries which engaged in them to improve their dynamic 
capabilities, and more generally. 
 
Leveraging Access to Skilled Labour 
 
The Indian subsidiary (D) of the Carraro Group - unique among the interviewed firms-, was 
able to leverage the science educated segment of the Indian labour market that has rapidly 
grown in recent years, to set up a research team of engineers  dedicated to tractor design 
and directed by a local manager. The firm took advantage of high levels of competencies by 
Indian engineers to carry out a capability building process, which has contributed key 
competences to the parent company. The subsidiary was created in 2006 with a staff of 45 
engineers who work, under local management, closely with the Group’s Italy based design 
department to design small tractors that big brands subcontract to it. Integration has been 
made possible by the advanced standardization and codification reached in design of 
mechanical components and by a common software that allow the two firms to interact in 
real time.  The cost of an engineer in India is half of the cost of a newly employed engineer 
in Italy, so the difference is not as big as the difference in blue collar wages, but flexibility 
and versatility of high level engineers is greater in India than in Italy, and the number of 
employees of the Indian subsidiary is due to increase in the near future. The plant of the 
mechanical engineering Group in China (B), in the same vein, has signed an agreement with 
a polytechnic that supplies good engineers.  
 
Developing New Forms of Production Organisation: Moving from Vertical Integration to 
Subcontracting, or Vice Versa. 
 
Subcontracting can be more efficient than direct production because it offers the potential 
for lower sunk costs and/or for enhanced flexibility. However, such benefits may be  offset 
by other, possibly higher, costs. When assets required to produce a good are specific, they 
are of value to the firm needing them and if provided by another firm can induce the 
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supplier to engage in opportunistic behaviour.  Also, it may be necessary to  rigorously test 
quality.  Furthermore,  the outsourcer is vulnerable to disruptions in supply (Endervick, 
1989, p. 54). Also, outsourcing often leads to high costs of coordination, maybe because of 
physical distance, or maybe because of difficulties in communicating with suppliers (Meyer et 
al., 2011, p. 245). 
In Italy, mechanical engineering producers make substantial use of subcontracting but in an 
emerging economy context there may be a preference for vertical integration. Let us 
consider, for example, the subsidiaries (B and C) of  the Carraro Group.  In the past, this 
Group outsourced in Italy, especially in the neighbourhood of its main plant, and encouraged 
some of its employees to set up their own firms, leasing them some of its own machines. 
Even today, the Italian plant assembles components that are produced in the nearby district. 
In the case of the Group’s India plant (C), however, all the manufacturing process takes 
place inside the firm. Selling on the international market requires the adoption of well 
defined standards and the vertical integration of operations guarantees for a buyer that a 
product has been made in accordance with particular desired characteristics. In the Group’s  
Chinese plant (B) some phases, such as hardening (an asset specific component24), are 
carried out externally and the firm has a sophisticated department to test incoming 
components, a function that in Italy does not exist as components are certified by the 
suppliers themselves.  
The integration of new suppliers into the value chain increases coordination challenges as 
reliable producers in India and China are seldom available given the limited quantity 
demanded by the small and medium-sized subsidiaries we have interviewed. External 
sourcing requires the existence of a group of competent and reliable suppliers  and so in 
these countries there is a need for small local producers to improve their performances25. 
Both in China and in India this creates a gap between capabilities required for the domestic 
market and those required by international customers, which raises the degree of 
monitoring and control required by buyers. Suppliers and customers cannot be easily linked 
and de-linked and subcontracting locally may require firms to develop relationships of trust 
(see, for example, I,L,and R) and to run their own technical test departments (B).  
Small foreign firms that want to buy components locally need to engage in a process similar 
to that which led to the formation of Italian industrial districts. Many difficulties would prove 
                                                
24 When asset specificity increases, the hazard of opportunism, as well as the bilateral dependency of the firms 
involved in the transaction, increases (with higher transaction costs), and subcontracting is less likely. 
Subcontracting transactions involved by firms I,L,R involve low asset specificity -  although the firms’ products have 
high specificity (i.e. all three firms have well defined brands) - , have low transaction costs, and are more easily 
managed through market governance (Zott, Amit, 2006). 
25 in developing countries suppliers are expected to meet requirements that frequently do not apply to their 
domestic markets (Keesing, Lall, 1992). 
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more tractable if large Italian firms were present in Asia, as this size of firm can help to 
create a network of local reliable producers. This is what happened in Italian districts in the 
sixties when relatively large firms outsourced a part of their production and created a 
market for parts and components that was at the origin of production fragmentation, 
capability building, and specialization that are the cornerstones of the industrial districts26.   
Basic assemblers do not need large direct investments.  Some of them work in rented 
premises (E,L,R assemble manually simple components) and sunk costs are very low in 
comparison with costs sustained by vertically integrated producers.  Complete labour 
flexibility (due to low wages and very limited labour protection) is available to even vertically 
integrated plants; this makes the ability to exploit flexibility through local networks of 
producers less relevant than in Italy. 
 
Engaging in Product Differentiation and Greater Product Sophistication: A Way of Achieving  
Competitive Advantage.  
  
Three subsidiaries (E,I,P) directly addressed the issues of redesigning  and re-engineering 
their products,   Two subsidiaries (E and I) began with simple production facilities carrying 
out basic production for their parent companies but their initial projects of assembling in 
Asia Italian components proved faulty. Both firms reshaped their product offers and 
production processes – the welding machines producer (E) outsourced locally previously 
imported components – in order to sell locally, launched its own brand targeted to the Asian 
market (NewRitmoAsia), and contributed to re-defining the core competencies of their 
parent companies. The fitting producer (I) addressed an entirely new market sector, the 
automotive, the textile cotton producer (P) added a shirt making activity to its traditional 
operations and repositioned itself on the international market, in the process internalizing an 
activity with high value added; a process it never did before, neither at home or abroad.  
 
Participating in New Distribution, Marketing and Sales Activities. 
  
According to Porter (1986, p.27), an important determinant of a country’s attractiveness as 
a platform for industry is the character of domestic demand. The proportion of sales made in 
the Asian region is an important indicator of the success of an Asian venture, and as such it 
plays the role of a critical performance parameter. For the factory in India (C) belonging to 
the Carraro Group, the products it sends back to Europe account for a much larger 
                                                
26  Langlois (2003) refers to  Williamson’s famous heuristic dictum:”In the beginning there were markets”. This is 
simply not true. For the role of large firms in Italian districts see Tattara (2001). For a recent assessment of the 
Italian districts see Becattini et al. (2009). 
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proportion of its turnover than in the case of the Group’s factory in China (B); and the 
latter’s prospects are brighter. During the recent global crisis, international demand 
drastically declined, and the factory in China addressed directly the comparatively more 
dynamic Asian market in order to fill idle capacity.  Of the 16 subsidiaries interviewed, the 
proportion of turnover accounted for by sales in China is significant for  5 of them 
(E,F,I,M,R).   The entrance into the Chinese market has not been easy for any of them as 
cultural and administrative distances have added to geographical distance, and a huge 
investment and management dedication was required.  
The furniture producer (F), has developed its own network. At present, it has in China 50 
retail stores selling under its own brand, each with the same design, colour and atmosphere. 
These stores are located inside “furniture cities” that are run by local retailers on a franchise 
basis27, at a cost to the firm that is clearly lower than the cost in Europe. A second selling 
route is that of sales to purchasing groups. These are common in China when lessees or new 
owners purchase, and then need to furnish, flats that are part of a new block, a frequent 
occurrence due to the fast growth of the Chinese cities. These groups operate on the 
internet and the firm has a strong presence in this market. A second example is the radiator 
producer (M) that has built on the experience of its Chinese partner, Golden Tiger Radiators 
and its personnel. The Italian Group maintains direct sales links to building firms, in addition 
to selling through retailers. 80% of sales are in the town of Beijing, where the climate is 
harsher and the population richer than in other towns.  
Retail distribution on the Chinese market is difficult as the product first requires to be 
reworked to make it suitable for Chinese tastes and habits. For example, the furniture firm 
(F) reports considerable waste in adapting Italian designs to the size of  wood panels sold in 
China that are of different size to those sold in Europe28. 
 
6. Social and Regulatory Determinants of Enterprise Behaviour and Value Chain 
Restructuring  
 
Our research has shown how the structure and organization of value chains are subject to 
varying strategies carried out by members of the chain, with some developing new dynamic 
capabilities in response to a changing environment, including particular social and regulatory 
contexts.  
Duties on value added in particular locations, tariffs on imports, the promptness of local 
                                                
27 The firm (F) enters into a continuing contractual relationship with local retailers that operate under the 
franchisor's trade name, with the franchisor's guidance, in exchange for a fee. 
28 Children’s rooms in China often require a grandmother’s bed, resulting in different layouts of the original  
projects. 
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bureaucracy, language difficulties are all elements that may condition decision making. One 
interviewed firm (R) highlighted the importance of reduced import duties in influencing plans 
to establish a subsidiary in Asia.  Another two (E,I) changed their initial plans because the 
effect of import duties had not been adequately considered. The lack of standards in the 
Chinese market was at the root of difficulties experienced by another firm (H) that was not 
able to sell its (relatively) expensive product on the local market, where the standard 
required elsewhere was not needed.  
There can also be social and cultural constraints on, abnd facilitators of, enterprise 
decison/making and success.  In fact, China and India differ from Europe in culture, legal 
traditions, business systems, and degree of political risk (Park, Luo, 2001; Prevezer, 2008; 
Estrin, Prevezer, 2010; Towers, Song, 2010; Yueh, 2007). Only 2 Italian managers out of 
the 16 we interviewed (firms E,G) wrote Chinese, and so for most every communication, 
from communications with workers to communications with the political authority, had to be 
mediated.  
The Chinese system is described by Italian managers as a flexible system where all is 
negotiable, from the basic rules that govern labour to taxes, export permission, and more. 
Some of the firms we interviewed were located in special economic zones, and it is well 
known that these played an important role in China’s striking performance. Special economic 
zones are characterized by their institutional flexibility that stems from having a privileged 
political status, the possession of an autonomous fiscal authority, and the employment of a 
streamlined organizational structure (Zheng, 2010). The system is for the most part 
considered adequate and attentive to the needs of foreign firms, particularly outside of the 
main cities, in the periphery, where foreign investments are most in demand, and are a sign 
of distinction for the political leaders in their effort to alleviate unemployment; and so 
negotiations are much easier. No one entrepreneur referred to the system as corrupt, but all 
agreed that interacting with Chinese institutions takes a lot of learning through trial and 
error. In India, transparency is much more valued but political uncertainty is much higher 
and this negatively affects Italian entrepreneurs. 
 
7. Conclusions. 
 
This article has reported on an  analysis of case studies of Italian multinationals that have 
invested in Asia. Cases were differentiated into 3 clusters according to variations in the 
motives for  Italian parent companies to establish new subsidiaries in Asia, the relation 
between the subsidiary and the parent company and the strategy pursued by the subsidiary. 
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All firms moving to Asia sought to increase their competitive advantages based on a  difficult 
to imitate asset - their technological and organisational capabilitiy -, combined with reduced 
costs of production following from  the relocation of business processes to low wage 
locations. In a fast-moving business environment open to global competition and 
characterized by the dispersion to various geographical locations, the achievement of 
sustainable advantage requires more than simply moving to low cost places. It requires also 
a capacity to enhance a subsidiary’s capabilities through the creation, extension, and 
upgrading of a  firm specific initial asset, and - when necessary - reconfiguring it (Teece, 
2007). Our study shows that the possession of dynamic capabilities often associated with 
high-tech industries also proves to be relevant for firms operating in traditional sectors, but 
they are  more difficult to acquire when operating in poorly developed markets, and where 
firms are faced by institutional constraints that are particularly liable to affect small firms. 
Several subsidiaries adapted quickly and moved to develop new products, technologies, and 
commercialization strategies. But almost all firms, including those that were pushed to Asia 
as part of an international network, had to face a decline in demand and were required to 
search for new commercial opportunities and customers. 
The interviews with senior managers identified the background economic elements that 
allowed firms to move to new strategies. Only the presence of firm specific advantages such 
as the ability to organise local resources, to adapt product design, and to develop own 
marketing and distribution strategies led to greater market success, but a capacity for 
flexibility was required. For example, the achievement of a reduction in supplier uncertainty, 
and the development of appropriate marketing strategies, required the subsidiaries to 
employ flexible management strategies. 
Our research challenges theoretical approaches which tend to see production chains, value 
chains, or commodity chains as relatively static organizational forms, rather than, as 
suggested by this paper, as much more fluid phenomena. The character of inter-firm 
relationships are liable to (possibly frequent) change as individual enterprises – even small 
enterprises – cannot rely on their initial competitive advantages, and must strive to sustain 
their advantages in the context of  dynamic, changing environments. 
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Table 1. Interviewed firms 
 
Interviewed subsidiary firm  Parent company in 
Italy 
 Name  of 
the firm 
Year of 
 
establis
hment  
Employee
s at the 
time of 
the visit 
 
Turnover 
millions € 
in 2008 
Name, 
location 
and date 
of the 
interview* 
Legal 
ownership/ 
Initial 
investment in 
the Asian plant 
in € 
 
Proportion 
of the   
parent 
company 
turnover 
Markets where 
the offshored 
subsidiary 
operates 
 
A Beijing 
Great 
Faram Wall 
Decoration 
China 
2002-03 142 7,5 Treviso 50% controlled 
by Faram and 
50% by Beijing 
Municipality/ 
2 millions 
<10% International 
furniture market 
(70%)  and 
China (30%) 
B Carraro, 
China 
2006 138 11 Padova, 
2008 
100% control 
by 
Carraro Group 
18 millions 
<10% China, Usa, 
Europe 
C Carraro 
India 
2000 243 28 Padova, 
2008 
100% control 
Carraro Group 
15 millions 
<10% sales in India and 
Europe (50%) 
D Carraro 
Technologi
es, India 
2006 42 1 Padova, 
2008 
100% control 
Carraro Group 
 
 Design cetre, in 
collaboration with 
AgriCarraro 
E Changsu 
Ritmo 
Welding 
Technology 
2005 22 0,7 Padova 100% control 
by Ritmo 
0,2 millions 
<5% Asia (80%), Italy 
F Colombini, 
China 
2005 100 2,6 Rep. 
San 
Marino 
80% control by 
Colombina 
2 millions 
<10% China, its own 
retail  network  
G Dalian Mato 
Furn&Compt  
China,  
2005-   
2006 
320 7,5 Treviso 100% control 
Mobilclan 
10 millions 
<20% Ikea USA (30%), 
Auri’s Kitchen  
UK, and France 
H FMMG 
China 
2006 93 5 Treviso, 
2010 
100% control 
FilMan 
MadeGroup/ 
20 millions 
<10% Glen Raven  
(60%) and Italy 
I General 
Fittings 
2005 99 2,1 Brescia 100% Gambari 
Group 
3 millions 
<10% China  (25-50%) 
and Europe 
L Hydroeast 2004 11 0,3 Padova, 
2009 
100% 
Idrobase 
0,1 millions 
<5% Europe (95%), 
Russia 
M Irsap 
Jintaige 
2005 150 1,9 Rovigo 100% control 
by Irsap Group 
<10% China 
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Radiators, 
China 
5 millions 
N Maschio 
China 
2006 56 4,4 Padova, 
2008 
100% control 
by 
Maschio&Gasp
ardo 
3 millions 
<5% Usa, Italy 
O MiniGears, 
China 
2004 268 9 Padova, 
2008 
100% control 
by  
GearWorld 
11 million 
<10% China, Usa 
P Tessitura 
Monti India 
2001 450 17 Treviso, 
2008 
100% control 
Tessitura monti 
50 millions 
> 70%  50% in Europe 
50% in Asia 
(40% to 
Aquarelle)  
Q Turbo 
Gears, 
India 
2008 231 4,3 Padova, 
2008 
100% control 
GearWorld 
20 millions 
<10% Sales to Carraro 
India and to 
Indian firms 
R Zamperla 2006 64 5,0 Vicenza 100% 
Zamperla 
1,3 millions 
<10% China and Asia 
 
 
*when the date is missing no inteview has taken place with the parent company. 
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Table 2. Industrial cost for 1 metre of cotton fabric in India,  € 
 
raw cotton yarn 44,77 
Dying 10,36  
Energy 18,08  
Labour 3,86 
Maintenance 5,18 
Depreciation 12,32 
Others 5,43 
 100,00 
total cost per metre 1,91€  
Sanforization (Italy) 0,47€ 
Total 2,38€ 
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